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Abstract
This review discusses two recent publications – a critical edition of  a primary source and a 
collection of  essays – around the Theory of  International Law of  Alberico Gentili (1552–
1608). On the one hand it examines Gentili’s interest in ancient Rome and how he used it 
as a paradigmatic case of  imperial order. But on the other, it questions our own interest in 
Gentili’s work. In line with Gentili’s own focus on questions of  justice, it not only shows that 
Gentili presents us with his own complex blend of  political responsibility and natural law, but 
highlights structural features and possible blind spots of  his ‘natural/private law’ paradigm 
that might apply also to current suggestions of  how to organize international law.
1 Introduction
In histories of  modern international law, Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) is routinely 
mentioned as a key author at the very origins of  this history. Shortly before Hugo 
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Grotius, he is said to have taken decisive steps in the application of  a modern con-
cept of  sovereignty to international relations and in the development of  an autono-
mous, secular jurisprudence.1 In the context of  a series of  events commemorating 
the 400th anniversary of  Gentili’s death, the Program in the History and Theory of  
International Law at the Institute for International Law and Justice (NYU) has mobil- 
ized considerable energies to document and complement its long-standing work on 
Gentili. The two publications under review are the outcome of  these efforts. The first 
is a critical, Latin–English edition of  De armis Romanis libri duo, a work published in 
1599 shortly after Gentili’s seminal De iure belli libri tres (1598). While the three books 
of  the latter work have established Gentili’s reputation as one of  the fathers of  modern 
international law, discussing the ius ad bellum, in bello and post bellum respectively, the 
lesser known two books on the wars of  the Romans are concerned with the justice of  
the ancient Roman Empire. The first book puts forward a critical, the second one an 
apologetic interpretation of  ancient (and early modern) witnesses of  and comment- 
aries on Roman history. Yet, the work is more than just an exercise in humanistic his-
toriography and more than an application of  the norms laid out in De iure belli to the 
behaviour of  ancient Rome. Rather, Gentili understands Rome as a paradigmatic case 
of  imperial order in general and, relying on his earlier work, probes the specific condi-
tions and normative criteria associated with the presence of  an expanding empire in 
the international arena.
The second volume contains essays by leading scholars of  legal history, interna-
tional law, classical literature, and political science investigating Gentili’s role in the 
context of  the formation of  early modern legal theory (and, at least in one of  the con-
tributions, practice) and his ideas of  empire and war as legal concepts.
This review addresses some of  these publications’ key aspects and their relation 
to today’s theory of  international law. Thus, it becomes clear not only how studies 
of  Gentili’s arguments are of  persistent relevance, but also what is at stake in draw-
ing one’s present inspiration from Gentili’s arguments: namely an idea of  global law 
modelled on private law, with a specific blind spot relating to asymmetries of  informal 
power.2
1 His most-quoted exhortation probably is ‘Let the theologians keep silence about a matter which is outside 
of  their province/theologi silete in munere alieno’: A. Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (1933), ii, I.12, at 92. In 
quoting De iure belli, I am using the English translation by John Rolfe which was published as vol. ii of  
No. 16 of  J. Brown Scott (ed.), The Classics of  International Law. As is customary, I use the page numbers 
that refer to the Latin original and are printed in the translation in the margins. The earliest champion 
of  Gentili as a key figure of  early modern international law was Thomas E. Holland; see T.E. Holland, 
An inaugural lecture on Albericus Gentilis (1874); Haggenmacher, ‘Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment 
of  Thomas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture’, in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury, and A. Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius 
and International Relations (1990), at 133. Also see G. van der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development 
of  International Law: His Life, Work and Times (1937) and D. Panizza, Alberico Gentili, giurista ideologo 
nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana (1981).
2 Of  course, this does not mean to suggest that other inspirations – typically Francisco de Vitoria’s model 
of  public law is invoked in contrast to Gentili – do not also have other, possibly more severe, problems. It is 
just important to be as clear as possible about the particular implications of  whatever model one favours.
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2 Gentili’s De armis Romanis
The present edition of  Gentili’s De armis Romanis libri duo is based on the first printing 
of  the work (by Wilhelm Anton in Hanau, 1599) and on its edition in the multi-volume 
Opera juridica selecta (by Giovanni Gravier in Naples, 1770). It is the first translation of  
the text and its first publication in Latin since the 1770 edition. In synoptical layout, it 
features both the Latin text and a judicious English translation by classical scholar David 
Lupher. Besides the main text, a generous apparatus helps the reader to work through 
the complexities of  the text on manifold paths and levels.3 And such help is welcome 
indeed, for already the peculiar organization of  the text provides puzzles to solve.
The whole treatise is (indirectly) inspired by the Carneadean dialogue in book three 
of  Cicero’s Republic4 and consists of  two books: ‘Indictment of  the Injustice of  the 
Romans in Warfare’ and ‘Defense of  the Justice of  the Romans in Warfare’. In the 
first one, an anonymous orator attacks Roman behaviour as consistently and utterly 
unjust. In the second one, a Roman refutes the arguments of  the first and promotes 
Rome as the paradigmatic yardstick for political and legal virtue. While the Accusator 
of  the first book can be recognized as Gentili’s alter ego,5 the Defensor of  the second 
book gets more than twice as many pages to make his case, has the ‘last word’, and 
gets to use many arguments that Gentili had advanced in his more systematic De iure 
belli. One explanation for this, offered by the editors of  The Wars of  the Romans and by 
several authors of  The Roman Foundations, sees this peculiar constellation as a result of  
the development of  the text: Originally the two parts were presented separately as pub-
lic speeches delivered on ceremonial occasions at the faculty of  law at the University of  
Oxford where Gentili was Regius professor of  Civil Law from 1580. A first version of  
the first speech had even been published separately before. Presenting the Accusator 
of  the first book as himself  could have been an ironic acknowledgement of  the prior 
publication,6 whereas Gentili’s actual sympathies were certainly more with the 
Defensor of  the second book.
Both books are identically divided into 11 chapters which are arranged chrono-
logically and discuss Roman (in)justice from the founding of  the city (Chs 2–3), the 
conquest of  Italy (Chs 4–7), the Punic Wars (Ch. 8), the expansion into the ‘Orient’ 
(Chs 9–10), to the age of  the Caesars (Ch. 11),7 plus one chapter on a comparison with 
3 There is an introduction by the editors, a table of  principal events in Gentili’s life, the usual notes on consulted 
editions, translation, marginal notes etc., a bibliography of  post-classical works referred to by Gentili, a small 
glossary of  terms, an index of  authors and works cited, and a general index. Also, Gentili’s dedicatory epistle 
to the Earl of  Essex from an earlier publication of  the first of  the two books is included as an appendix.
4 Cf. Kingsbury and Straumann, ‘Introduction’, in The Wars of  the Romans, at xii–xvii and Lupher, ‘The De 
armis Romanis and Roman Imperialism’, in The Roman Foundations, at 97f.
5 For one, the Defensor is addressed as ‘a Roman’, whereas the Accusator is identified as ‘a Picene’, born in 
San Ginesio, Gentili’s own birthplace. David Lupher’s contribution to the second volume discusses this in 
more detail.
6 As a matter of  his elaborate style, Gentili used irony and sarcasm, rhetorical questions, and all sorts of  
other devices amply.
7 Cf. Panizza, ‘Alberico Gentili’s De armis Romanis: The Roman Model of  the Just Empire’, in The Roman 
Foundations, at 61–64.
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Alexander the Great and one concluding summary chapter. At times the two orators 
disagree on the historical facts, but more often they disagree on their evaluation. At all 
times, however, both adduce numerous classical and early modern sources as witness 
for their position8 and they show considerable wit in criticizing the sources that speak 
for the other party. With its somewhat inconclusive display of  rhetorical technique 
and the ostensible lack of  systematic arguments, Gentili’s intention with De armis 
Romanis certainly was to no small extent a demonstration of  his humanist erudition 
and of  his skill in making this wealth of  material weigh in for whatever purpose. But 
is this all? Cannot more be gleaned from it than how a humanist discourse of  a certain 
historical context used classical source materials?
First of  all, one can learn something about the complexity of  early modern political 
and legal thought: Many interpretations of  early modern political theory suggest that 
it was structured by an opposition between ‘humanist’ and ‘scholastic’ tendencies.9 
They tend to understand Gentili as an exponent of  ‘humanist’ thought, disqualifying 
considerations of  justice and promoting imperial grandeur as supreme guiding prin- 
ciple for foreign policy. He is portrayed as pitted against the scholastic ‘theologians’ 
such as Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto who are said to insist on judging 
political strategies according to moral merits and according to what they conceive as 
natural law. But, as the editors point out in their introduction to The Roman Foundations, 
this dichotomy masks the diversity of  (at least) the ‘humanist’ camp. Taking one’s cue 
from the importance of  classical thought that is central to all accounts of  human-
ism, one should discern at least five different venues of  its influence. Labelling Gentili 
a ‘humanist’, one should then all the more urgently specify which of  the dimen-
sions is present in what way.10 First, there are republican authors and historians like 
Livy, Dionysius of  Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and Polybius who are taken up in what 
Quentin Skinner has termed the ‘neo-Roman’ tradition.11 Then, there is an early mod-
ern affirmation of  Roman imperialism, often used in justifications of  the Spanish and 
Portuguese conquests.12 Third, there is an important ‘Ciceronian-oratorical’ strand 
of  discussions relying on writers such as Tacitus and the Greek sophists. A fourth 
group goes back to the Peripatetic and Stoic tradition, mediated by Lactantius and 
Augustine and resulting in what Richard Tuck has dubbed the ‘scholastic’ tradition.13 
Finally, there is a tradition of  Roman civil law discourse, mediated by glossators and 
8 Apart from the immense number of  classical works cited, the bibliography of  postclassical works used 
by Gentili also comprises no fewer than five pages, from the historian Paulus Aemilius Veronensis (c. 
1455–1529) to John Xiphilinus, an epitomator of  Dio Cassius of  the 12th century.
9 Cf. most notably R. Tuck, The Rights of  War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (1999).
10 David Lupher’s earlier work, Romans in a New World. Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America 
(2003) already pointed to the important role which the Roman paradigm had even in scholastic theoriz-
ing about international law. The present two volumes extend this to another context and show that it is 
indeed incontrovertible – but also that it needs qualification when relied on in interpreting early modern 
political thought. For the following see Kingsbury and Straumann, ‘Introduction’, supra note 4, at 2–4.
11 Cf. Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (1998).
12 Cf. Lupher, supra note 10.
13 For this and the oratorical tradition, cf. Tuck, supra note 9.
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commentators, extending Roman civil law ideas to apply to political and ethical issues 
in general.14 Alberico Gentili and his work The Wars of  the Romans exhibit a conjunc-
ture of  all these mentioned dimensions, and at the same time illustrate that it makes 
sense to keep them analytically distinct. For example, this allows one to account for 
the divergences between Gentili’s ‘legalistic’ assessment of  Rome’s imperial expansion 
and his ‘republican’ praise of  its internal organization; but more on that below.
Another thing about Gentili’s humanism that is significant and worth noting from 
the outset is that for both parties in Gentili’s work, justice is the crucial criterion. Thus, 
to imagine him as a Machiavellian philosopher who would favour raison d’état over 
justice would be highly misleading. Then again, the relationship of  justice with the 
self-interest of  the state is a complex mutual implication, and while it cannot so easily 
be retrieved from The Wars of  the Romans (nor, for that matter, from the more system-
atic De iure belli15), the work as a whole gives much food for further study. For instance, 
it is surprising to see how lucid Gentili’s critique of  Roman imperialism is, anticipat-
ing many arguments that are forceful even today. One of  the central and recurring 
aspects of  the critique – and a point not entirely rebutted by the Defensor – concerns 
the formal character of  Roman justifications. The Romans, says the Accusator, stra-
tegically profited from a general blindness of  the legal forms to cumulative effects and 
to substantial inequalities of  power and of  opportunities. In short, the Accusator sub-
mits that the Romans ‘created the widest possible network of  alliances not in order 
to defend friends but to increase the chances of  “legitimate” aggression against oth-
ers.’16 Further, they actively claimed and exploited a monopoly on the identification 
of  the relevant formal mechanisms and on interpreting compliance with those forms. 
Important discursive strategies concerned, for example, the capacity of  actors to make 
binding agreements (while Roman generals could not conclude treaties binding on 
Rome herself, foreign commanders were taken to create valid commitments for their 
nations; and with brigands, word need not be kept at all), the public or merely private 
character of  injuries committed by private individuals or associations (depending on 
which the failure to suppress them did or did not constitute a breach of  the law of  
nations by the ‘responsible’ party), or even the distinction between legitimate warfare 
between two rival parties and the practice of  piracy calling for intervention by any 
third party (Rome). These relied very much on mechanisms, arguments, and analo-
gies from Roman civil law, and there is not the slightest hint of  a possible check of  their 
being in the general, i.e. global or universal, interest.17
14 Christopher Warren’s contribution to The Roman Foundations points out that there is at least one more 
aspect to (Gentili’s) humanism that is not adequately reflected in the list above: the interpretation, cri-
tique, and writing of  poetry. Other literary genres such as drama and belles-lettres could certainly be 
added.
15 Cf. Gentili, De iure belli, supra note 1, III.12.
16 Panizza, ‘Alberico Gentili’s De Armis Romanis: The Roman Model of  the Just Empire’, in The Roman 
Foundations, at 70. Cf. Gentili, The Wars of  the Romans, supra note 1, I.10, at 83. Compare this critique 
with Antony Anghie’s critique of  Spanish imperialism in his Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of  
International Law (2005), e.g., at 21. Interestingly, Panizza identifies the ‘theological’ mode of  reasoning 
in this critique.
17 Again, this anticipates today’s critique: cf. ibid., or Anthony Pagden’s contribution to The Roman Foundations.
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Apart from these aspects and from the more or less evenly distributed method-
ological arguments about how critically to interpret ancient text witnesses, the more 
cogent rules and the more general maxims are to be found in the second, affirmative 
book of  The Wars of  the Romans.
3 Civility and Rule of  Law
According to Diego Panizza the arguments in favour of  Roman justice can be grouped 
into two categories: arguments of  legality and arguments of  humanist political moral-
ity.18 Inadvertently confirming the critique of  the Accusator mentioned above, he 
observes that in the second book on The Wars of  the Romans, assessments of  Roman 
expansion seem to rely mainly on arguments about formal legality.19 Reasons of  politi-
cal morality on the other hand come into play rather in assessments of  Rome’s inter-
nal organization and structure. Gentili explains Roman virtue as being centred on the 
values of  liberty, peace, unity, civility, and humanity and praises it for preventing a 
much quicker decay in the late days of  the Empire.20
But actually in justifying imperial expansion the ‘ethical dimension’ plays no small 
role either. Gentili’s Defensor does not just rely on the mere legality of  the wars, but 
in many places praises the imperial expansion for its civilizing effects. For instance, 
he maintains that, starting out as more or less barbarian, the peoples of  Italy became 
‘cultivated’, the Germans ‘polished’, the Spaniards ‘prosperous’, the Britons even 
‘attached to a part of  the world’.21 The values of  liberty, peace, and unity are para-
mount, however. It was the pax romana that did away with internal wars, civil strife, 
and general insecurity. And not only peace, but even liberty was bestowed on the con-
quered peoples by Rome’s policy of  giving them equal rights of  citizenship and equal 
access to military and political posts.
We have wished our enemies to be friends, allies, citizens. Behold, gradually the citizenship 
was given to all who lived in the Roman world. Behold: Rome, the common fatherland. O the 
immeasurable glory of  Roman citizenship!22
More precisely, the Defensor states that the conquered peoples were ‘brought over 
by our laws to a more cultivated way of  life’.23 And besides peerless Roman virtue, this 
blessed civil state has been actualized throughout the Empire ultimately by the institu-
tion of  Roman Law. Unlike Roman virtue, however, Roman Law ‘persists to the present 
day … and penetrates into all parts of  the world, even those parts to which Roman 
18 For the following see Panizza, ‘Alberico Gentili’s De Armis Romanis’, esp. at 63–83.
19 E.g., Gentili, The Wars of  the Romans, supra note 1, II.3, at 165: ‘[D]id [Tullus] initiate war against the 
Alban fathers in order to stir the inactive Romans to war? This isn’t what Vergil sang. And yet if  this aim 
was sought through a justifiable occasion (this is what we are aiming at), you will no longer find fault. … 
And you will agree with all those others who know that this is a method of  good government.’
20 Ibid., II.9, at 260 or II.13, at 355.
21 Ibid., II.1, at 129–131.
22 Ibid., II.13, at 347; see also II.5, at 203.
23 Ibid., II.13, at 349, my emphasis.
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arms did not reach’.24 Hence its law is Rome’s most important legacy and the connec-
tion to Gentili’s contemporary concerns. As the Defensor (in line with Gentili’s other 
works) professes, Roman Law is central to the pending organization and well-being of  
the whole world:
Picenus, you possess what the world longs for, you possess what the world delights in – the 
world which, though deprived of  that blessed good luck of  our empire, nevertheless tenaciously 
hangs onto and thirstily gulps down Roman laws, with which it renews for itself  the sweet 
memory of  its ancient happiness under Roman rule and alleviates the sadness of  these times 
by this little bit of  pleasure that has been mixed in.25
On the one hand, Gentili’s emphasis on the Roman civil law making up the law of  
nations and the law of  nature thus becomes better understandable, the central role 
of  this equation becomes even more obvious, and its implications and consequences 
more urgent to investigate. On the other hand, the sceptical objections and reserva-
tions of  the Accusator as regards the law’s formalism become more pertinent as well 
and it is regrettable that neither Gentili’s Defensor of  Roman justice nor a greater 
number of  contributors to The Roman Foundations discuss them more extensively.26
4 Roman Law and Early Modern Law of  Nations
The Roman Foundations of  the Law of  Nations is a collection of  16 essays comment-
ing on Gentili’s conception of  the law of  war and the law of  nations. The De armis 
Romanis is discussed extensively only in Panizza’s and Lupher’s contributions, an indi-
cation of  how underexposed this work is.27 Here is a short summary of  most of  the 
contributions:28
John Richardson inquires into the development of  the notions of  imperium and pro-
vincia in ancient Rome and their shift from an understanding of  a magistrate’s (con-
stitutionally constrained) legal authority and responsibility to political control over a 
territory. Clifford Ando points out that, attempting to cloak strategic action and vio-
lence with an air of  legality, the later Roman Empire seems to have retrojected some 
24 Ibid., II.13, at 351. Also cf. Kingsbury and Straumann, ‘Introduction’, supra note 4, at xviii–xxii.
25 Gentili, The Wars of  the Romans, supra note 1, II.13, at 351. Cf. Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, supra note 1, 
I.3, at 26.
26 Ando, ‘Empire and the Laws of  War: A Roman Archaeology’; Pagden, ‘Gentili, Vitoria, and the 
Fabrication of  a “Natural Law of  Nations”’, and, to a certain extent, Lupher, ‘The De armis Romanis and 
the Exemplum of  Roman Imperialism’ are notable exceptions. Ando’s and Lupher’s contributions are at 
the same time the only ones that not only mention but exploit the structural features of  The Wars of  the 
Romans for their interpretations.
27 Apart from the two essays mentioned and cursory discussions in the other contributions, cf. Tuori, 
‘Alberico Gentili and the Criticism of  Expansion in the Roman Empire. The Invader’s Remorse’, 11 J 
History Int’l L (2009) 205. Other works discussing De armis Romanis are Panizza, ‘Il “De Armis Romanis” 
di Alberico Gentili: paradigmi imperiali, guerra e la “moderna cosmopoli”’, 25 Filosofia politica (2011) 
215 and C. Ando, Law, Language, and Empire in the Roman Tradition (2011), esp. ch. III.
28 Those not covered here are omitted because they play a role in the ensuing discussion of  two systematic 
issues inspired by the volume as a whole. See infra.
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of  its (in fact ancient) civil law concepts into analogous rules of  fetial law that were 
then claimed to have regulated Roman warfare from the outset.29 Diego Panizza insists 
on the continuity between De armis Romanis and De iure belli, both displaying Gentili’s 
humanist approach susceptible to and made plausible by the Tuckean contrast to the 
theological authors of  the so-called School of  Salamanca. By contrast, David Lupher 
underlines the contradictory structure of  De armis Romanis and criticizes the imputa-
tion of  an unequivocal idea drawn from the interpretation of  other works, accord-
ing to which Gentili emphatically and unwaveringly supported the Roman Empire. 
Christopher Warren examines the relationship between Gentili’s humanism, under-
stood as an emphasis on studia humanitatis, on classical learning, especially poetry and 
literature, on the one hand and the authority he deems necessary to expound and pass 
on the laws of  war on the other.
Both Noel Malcolm and Peter Schröder agree that Gentili’s concept of  unjust enmity 
serves to create conceptual room altogether outside the polycentric order of  sovereign 
states and becomes a political tool, eventually excluding Indians (and to a certain 
extent Ottoman Turks) from the realm of  legitimate actors in the international sphere. 
But whereas Schröder treats this as a matter of  indispensable political trust relation-
ships, Malcolm emphasizes that Gentili’s actual justification of  such conceptual 
moves relies on theological arguments. Randall Lesaffer compares Gentili’s originality 
in theorizing the ius post bellum with actual early modern state practice in peace treaty 
making, and thereby highlights his discrimination between intra-European and colo-
nial contexts. Lauren Benton in her analysis of  De Hispanica advocatio, a posthumously 
(1613) published text comprising records of  Gentili’s legal advocacy for the Spanish 
crown at the English Court of  Admiralty in the last years of  his life, shows how in his 
comments on the law of  the sea Gentili struggled to develop a model of  competing 
and overlapping jurisdictions designed to cope with ‘a global legal regime inhabited 
by states of  imprecisely defined and fragmented sovereignty’.30 Acknowledging the 
appropriation of  legal vocabulary by reason of  state approaches and the subsequent 
dominance of  the latter in early modernity,31 Martti Koskenniemi traces the origins 
and the development of  an alternative tradition of  constraints on arbitrary political 
action: Refining the methodical apprehension of  the ‘real’, i.e. material conditions of  
self-preservation of  the state, the sought-after rationalization of  politics was, at least 
29 Ando shows that while fetial law was celebrated as a traditional constraint on Roman warfare at the age 
of  the Caesars, the actual history of  that institution was only very sparsely documented up to the sec-
ond century BCE. Comparing the (later, retrospective) description of  fetial law’s procedure for declaring 
war to the ancient, better documented civil law institution of  the legis actio sacramento in rem, he also 
submits that its presumed constraining character was rather a rhetorical construction and that, ‘in the 
Roman case, the application of  law issued not in an avoidance of  violence but an evasion of  responsibil-
ity’ (at 51).
30 Benton, ‘Legalities of  the Sea in Gentili’s Hispanica Advocatio’, in The Roman Foundations, at 280.
31 In fact, reiterating his conviction that what is perceived as legal framework of  international relations 
before the mid-19th century is nothing but a functional extension of  ‘Baroque statecraft’ (at 305) or the 
external aspect of  the business of  government, and that it is rather a prehistory of  international law that 
is at hand (at 298f.), Koskenniemi portrays the ‘political’ stakes and interests as the organizing motives in 
those discussions, crystallizing, e.g., in Gentili’s juridical formulation of  the reason of  state doctrine.
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in 17th and 18th century France and Germany, shifting more and more to political 
economy, emerging finally in theories akin to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of  Nations.
For the present reviewer, two aspects of  Gentili’s thought deserve to be taken up 
again more extensively, as they refer to a more general understanding of  different 
approaches to international law and of  their development in early modernity. The first 
of  these aspects is the above-mentioned picture of  Gentili as a ‘humanist’ author who 
would focus on self-preservation and abandon ambitions of  objective or public inter-
national law. The second one is the relativization of  this picture through his analysis 
of  the relationship between natural law and the law of  nations. In the end, it turns out 
that Gentili advances not so much a proto-positivist concept of  law and a realist con-
cept of  sovereign power as his own blend of  political responsibility and natural law.
5 Humanist Law of  War
A number of  contributions stress that in Gentili’s new approach to international law 
and to the law of  war the most characteristic and momentous innovation was pre-
cisely what opposed him to the older, ‘theological’ tradition that had discussed war 
and international relations in terms of  a just, unitary global order and of  sinful or 
virtuous actions.32 Francisco de Vitoria had already conceded that, while a war could 
not be just on both sides objectively, for reasons of  invincible ignorance and good faith, 
both parties might effectively be justified in fighting,33 but only Gentili more conse-
quently treated both parties as legally just enemies. Justice then was no longer to be 
understood on an ideal level, but rather as drawing on formally defined just causes.34 
Punishment moved out of  focus and self-defence became the dominant motive in 
formulating such causes.35 And Gentili famously extended the concept of  legitimate 
self-defence to cover even pre-emptive aggression.36 For the ius post bellum, which 
Gentili was the first to discuss extensively,37 this meant that the terms of  peace no 
longer depended on some objectively just state that had to be restored, but rather on 
the authority of  the victor, whose title was constituted by his very victory, or on an 
agreement between the belligerents.38
In this picture, a plurality of  self-interested, sovereign states is ordered by a balance 
of  power, and one might even discern a peculiar ‘cunning of  reason’ built into the con-
stitution of  nature, by virtue of  which men are led by self-interest, or ‘utility’ broadly 
understood, to pursue and bring about an order of  ‘justice’.39
32 Cf. Schröder, ‘Vitoria, Gentili, Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law of  Nations’, at 165–167.
33 Vitoria, ‘On the Law of  War’, in Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings (ed. A. Pagden and J. Lawrance, 
1991), at 293, e.g., at 313.
34 Cf. Panizza, supra note 18, at 65.
35 Cf. Piirimäe, ‘Alberico Gentili’s Doctrine of  Defensive War and its Impact on Seventeenth-Century 
Normative Views’, in The Roman Foundations, esp. at 191–197.
36 Cf., e.g., ibid., at 195–199.
37 Lesaffer, ‘Alberico Gentili’s ius post bellum and Early Modern Peace Treaties’, in The Roman Foundations, at 
214–217.
38 Cf. ibid., at 222–226, 230.
39 Panizza, supra note 18, at 82.
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6 Natural Law, the Law of  Nations and the Corpus iuris
On the other hand, the contrast between ‘humanists’ and ‘theologians’ often rests 
on stylized versions of  the theories,40 and for certain questions the contributions to 
The Roman Foundations prove that it can be more productive to turn one’s back on 
this dichotomy and inquire directly into systematic issues. Thus, the contributions 
of  Straumann, Blane and Kingsbury, Waldron, and Pagden in different ways inspect 
the entanglement of  Roman civil law, the law of  nations, and natural law in Gentili’s 
thought. Assuming a roughly Bodinian conception of  sovereignty which implies the 
impossibility of  a secular legislation above and binding on the sovereigns and suggests 
a state of  nature between them, the task for Gentili is obviously to conceptualize inter-
national relations as a legal framework. As Straumann shows by reference to Gentili’s 
idea that with the lex regia the Roman people has authorized the absolute Rex anglo-
rum, there is an idea of  popular consent at work in the legitimation of  factual state 
practice. However, that idea itself  is not to be understood as the normative core of  a 
proto-positivistic doctrine that would then be carried over to the sovereign. Rather the 
idea is that even behind the consent of  the Roman people lie norms of  natural law. And 
given the absence of  political institutions above the sovereigns, the crucial moment is 
not the public law act of  authorization by the people, but the formulation of  civil law 
rules, the universality of  which is indicated by the consent of  the people. Due to the 
wisdom, prudence, and virtue of  Rome’s jurists, and due to the unparalleled exten-
sion and approbation of  Rome in social space and historical time, the Corpus iuris pos-
sesses a universality that transcends its being particular to a given state and makes it 
the prime declaration of  natural law. It contains rules and specifies rights which are 
rooted in natural human reason itself, and hence apply to all human beings, even in 
a state of  nature – ‘to citizens, states (civitates), and sovereigns (principes) equally.’41 
Both Jeremy Waldron and Anthony Pagden take their cue from this equation between 
Roman and natural law, but while the former emphasizes the flexibility and tunability 
of  natural law reasoning introduced by the empirical mediation between ideal natu-
ral law and the practical formulations of  Roman Law,42 the latter points out that the 
Corpus iuris is a particular, historically finalized mediation that stands at the centre 
of  a particular profession and expertise. Presenting it as a knowable historical datum 
40 This reviewer would for instance take issue with the reconstructions of  Vitoria’s theory that some of  the 
contributions put forward, but the point is precisely that for the present context the contrast between 
Gentili and Vitoria is not so instructive after all. For a comparison of  the two positions that focuses on the 
particular issue of  the society of  mankind see Wagner, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili on the 
Legal Character of  the Global Commonwealth’, 31 OJLS (2011) 565.
41 Cf. Straumann, ‘The Corpus iuris as a Source of  Law Between Sovereigns in Alberico Gentili’s Thought’, 
in The Roman Foundations, at 115, 120. Also Blane and Kingsbury briefly evoke the contrast between 
Vitoria’s conception of  the international legal framework, modelled after an intra-state (public) law par-
adigm, and Gentili’s treatment of  states as individuals to which the logic of  comparative (natural) indi-
vidual rights is applied: see Blane and Kingsbury, ‘Punishment and the ius post bellum’, in The Roman 
Foundations, at 250.
42 Waldron, ‘Ius gentium: A Defence of  Gentili’s Equation of  the Law of  Nations and the Law of  Nature’, in 
The Roman Foundations, esp. at 290–293.
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implies a reification of  natural/international law, the global access to which, i.e. the 
interpretation of  which, was to be monopolized by European (Roman) jurists.43
This quandary becomes more topical when one considers Gentili’s conception of  
enforcement of  ius gentium/ius naturale: Since otherwise one could not assume that nat-
ural law was efficacious, one first has to suppose that holders of  natural rights – states as 
well as individuals and corporate actors – possess the authority to vindicate these rights 
even in a state of  nature, that is to say, by force and independently of  any political asso-
ciation and judicial authorization. From this follows a natural right to defend oneself  
which extends to punishment for the sake of  deterrence, beyond the limits of  mere resti-
tution.44 Also, formerly an agent would have a just cause for war only if he had suffered 
an injury at the hands of  his opponent: the indispensable actual injury (iniuria accepta) 
would authorize the belligerent, and it would authorize only him who had received it. For 
Gentili, though, the injury need no longer be actual. Instead it can also be the anticipa-
tion of  an injury that justifies pre-emptive warfare. With his concept of  preventive war-
fare the injury moves altogether out of  focus, and it is the mere power and the suspected 
propensity of  the opponent to effect an injury that can justify an offensive war.45
Finally the treatment of  pirates and its generalization to a concept of  the unlaw-
ful enemy makes it possible to exclude actors from legality altogether46 – unlawful 
enemies apparently cannot claim even natural rights! Gentili’s own strategic applica-
tion of  this argumentative strategy in concrete cases to actual pirates47 and in more 
abstract reflections to Indians and Turks illustrates its hazardous character.48
7 Conclusion
While Gentili’s aim of  discussing the Roman Empire and basing his doctrine of  the 
law of  nations on Roman Law is well reflected and argued about at various places 
43 Pagden, supra note 26, esp. at 352–354 and 360f.
44 Cf. Blane and Kingsbury, supra note 41. This and the following clearly exceed my own previous interpre-
tation (based largely on De iure belli) of  the binding force of  Gentili’s law of  nations consisting primarily in 
a moral obligation of  the sovereigns. Cf. Wagner, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili on the Legal 
Character of  the Global Commonwealth’. And yet, while arguments for a definite set of  substantial legal 
norms, for authoritative interpretation, and for the enforcement of  the law of  nations are more readily 
available with De armis Romanis now, they seem to be anything but unproblematic.
45 Cf. Piirimäe, supra note 35, at 196–198.
46 Gentili justifies this exclusion by opposing pirates to humanity as a whole (e.g., De iure belli, supra note 1, 
I.4, at 34f. or I.25, at 201f.). This is probably rather to accommodate the traditional definition of  pirates 
as hostis humani generis than due to some conceptual cogency – neither is the concept of  humanity as a 
whole necessary to strip pirates of  all legal standing, nor does it lend any plausibility to the designation of  
certain persons as being outside all law.
47 Cf. Benton, supra note 30, at 279f.
48 Cf. Pagden, supra note 26, at 355–357. Gentili’s insistence on the discrimination between what would 
later be called ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ societies is also reflected in his distinction between two modes 
of  ius post bellum in the context of  actual historical developments; cf. Lesaffer, supra note 37, at 226. It 
remains unclear what this status of  ‘civility’ depends on – on the one hand, there are reasons to think 
that the nature of  the respective society’s own legal institutions matters, but on the other hand, it often 
seems very malleable by political interests.
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in the second volume reviewed here, our own possible motivations for discussing 
Gentili remain to be read between the lines. Besides Waldron’s plea for a combined 
moral-empirical perspective on legal theorizing,49 and besides (perfectly valid) histori-
cal interest, what appeal and what drawbacks does Gentili’s approach have for present 
concerns with international law?
Taking the organization of  international law around the paradigm of  private law 
and the simultaneous endowment of  private law with the normative force of  natu-
ral law to be the gist of  Gentili’s systematic approach, the analysis of  private order-
ing might be seen as the starting point for the discovery of  more general rules of  
international law and Gentili as an inspiring author for attempts to theorize such 
general rules, their applicability, and their binding force. A popular, if  not uncontro-
versial example of  such a project would be the discourse on the lex mercatoria. If  one 
is not bewildered by such a combination of  historical and jurisprudential, contem-
porary interests in the first place, one will not find it surprising, then, to learn that 
one of  the organizers of  the project behind the two volumes is strongly involved in 
attempts to formulate and normatively develop the theory of  global administrative 
law (GAL).50 Of  course, it cannot be the intention to enter into substantive discussion 
of  such contemporary approaches at this point. But it may be worthwhile to point out 
how a reading and a discussion of  Gentili’s text can shed new light on them: What 
Gentili’s extensive discussion of  Roman imperialism in its entirety forcefully urges 
one to do in such a context is to reflect critically on the injustices and exclusions one 
risks legitimating. It is precisely the richness of  the substantial examples Gentili dis-
cusses in the first book of  The Wars of  the Romans, their being passed over (at least 
to a certain extent) in the otherwise coherent legitimation presented in the second 
book, their entanglement with the architecture of  his theory of  the law of  nations, 
and their connection to the well-known malpractices of  European colonialism that 
suggest a systematic weight of  the reservations which should not be dismissed eas-
ily. The burden requiring the historian of  the Roman Empire, the Gentili scholar, and 
even the theoretician of  today’s global legal space critically to track down aspects of  
domination such as those sketched by the Accusator, this burden is not dispelled by 
just assuming, for example, the untrustworthiness of  one or another of  his witnesses. 
Structurally, what Gentili’s private/natural law paradigm may be missing most des-
perately is a forum to prevent the law from only ever working to the benefit of  the 
powerful, a forum for all parties concerned to participate effectively on equal stand-
ing and to agree on common interpretations of  the law and its purposes, and hence 
also on common interests and values. One principal point of  contention between the 
global administrative law theory and other approaches is precisely this: against private 
49 Jeremy Waldron is a notable exception to the critique just voiced. However, comparing Gentili’s equation 
of  ius gentium and natural law to a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium, his contribution focuses more on 
methodological than on substantial aspects of  the question of  what benefits a study of  Gentili’s thought 
might bring.
50 Cf. Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, ‘The Emergence of  Global Administrative Law’, 68 L & Contemporary 
Problems (2004) 15.
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ordering and lex mercatoria, Kingsbury’s GAL approach is set to maintain a legitimacy 
aspect of  law, and thus insists on requirements of  publicness in law.51 Spelling this 
out as inter-public law, he suggests a concept of  public entities and of  publicness as 
interrelation between such entities.52 Whether or not this in turn fails to meet the 
legitimacy challenge is contested, based on stronger ideas of  legitimacy as connected 
to public spaces of  legal practice and the inclusive, participatory character of  their 
procedures.53 Seeing how themes such as the qualification of  the regular or unlawful 
nature of  different entities (preceding the mutual weighing of  their respective norms) 
and the danger of  illegitimate normative ordering disguised by legal structures recur 
in the debate, the two reviewed volumes with their extensive treatment of, for  example, 
compliance with universal norms of  international, civil, or natural law, or of  the jus-
tice and injustice of  attempts to export the rule of  law might establish a new, comple-
mentary facet to the debate and help one better to understand its stakes, options, and 
background relations.
However, marking and illuminating a hitherto underexposed, yet highly significant 
step in the history of  the theory of  international law, their importance certainly goes 
way beyond either purely historical interest or some relevance for just this one par-
ticular discussion. They promise to be truly ground-breaking: opening new debates 
and enabling unforeseen revisions of  the established ones. The editors are to be con-
gratulated without reservation for their cardinal – and beautiful – accomplishment.
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